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Economic Impacts of Residential Property Abandonment and the Genesee 
County Land Bank in Flint, Michigan 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This study documents work by the Genesee County Land Bank (GCLB) to alleviate the burden 
of abandoned and tax-foreclosed properties in the City of Flint, Michigan. The costs of property 
abandonment and direct and indirect effects of GCLB programs are estimated. Results suggest 
that abandoned housing does indeed have a negative impact on the values of houses in close 
proximity and that GCLB programs ameliorate these negative impacts.  
 
Many cities across the U.S. are grappling with the decline of their urban cores. Older industrial 
cities are especially hard hit, with economic and market forces resulting in job losses and 
population decline. Even in growing metropolitan areas, urban cores are eroded by suburban and 
exurban residential and commercial growth. Because of population shifts, high unemployment 
rates and weak real estate market conditions, many of these cities contain large tracks of 
unoccupied, abandoned residential structures and vacant lots. These properties attract crime, 
strain the resources of local police and fire departments, depreciate property values, and degrade 
the quality of surrounding neighborhoods. 
 
Declining quality of neighborhoods diminishes demand for urban property and consequently 
decreases market values of residential properties – compounding the problem of decreased tax 
revenues further. In many cities, the laws and regulations that define options for managing these 
properties have been made obsolete by the sheer volume of incoming tax foreclosed properties 
each year (Alexander 2005). Across the country, progressive community leaders are using new 
approaches to fight blight and abandonment in an attempt to rediscover value in forgotten urban 
lands. One such approach is the creation of contemporary land banks. 
 
The Genesee County Land Bank (GCLB) is the most recently created land bank designed to 
address the tax delinquency and abandonment problem. Genesee County is home to the City of 
Flint, where the city’s reliance on a waning American automotive industry has combined with 
other economic and social factors to cause severe population and job loss, property 
abandonment, and decline in the quality of neighborhood environments. The 2000 U.S. Census 
estimates that over 12% of Flint’s housing stock is empty. With over 44,000 residential 
properties in the City of Flint, this equates to over 5,000 residential housing units that are 
currently vacant or abandoned.  
 
For this study, a hedonic price function for residential properties in Flint was estimated to 
determine the impact of abandoned residences and vacant lots on surrounding property values. 
The hedonic price function was specified so that the sale price of a particular house is explained 
as a function of:  
• the number of abandoned single- and multi-family residential structures within the 
proximities of 0-500 feet, 501-1000 feet, and 1001-1500 feet to the house; 
• the number of vacant residential lots within the proximities of 0-500 feet, 501-1000 feet, 
and 1001-1500 feet to the house; 
• the physical attributes of the house; 
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• the year and quarter in which the house sold (e.g. first quarter of 2002); and 
• the census tract in which the house is located. 
 
Results from the hedonic model indicate that an additional abandoned structure within 500 feet 
will reduce the sale price of a residence by 2.27%; an additional abandoned structure within 501-
1000 feet will decrease sale price by 1.92%; and an additional abandoned structure between 
1001-1500 feet will decrease sale price by 1.11%. Vacant lot coefficients suggest a decrease in 
housing prices by 1.5% when the lot is within 500 feet of a home. No significant housing value 
effect results from additional vacant lots between 501 and 1000 feet from homes, while a 
significant positive housing value effect of 0.5% is found for an additional vacant lot between 
1001 and 1500 feet. These results are consistent with those found by researchers in other states.  
 
Several GCLB property management programs are working in unison to restructure, redevelop, 
stabilize and recreate value in declining neighborhood environments across the city. During the 
2002-2005 period, the land bank authority (originally the Land Reutilization Council) in Genesee 
County acquired roughly 2,000 abandoned lots and 1,000 abandoned structures through 
legislated “fast track quiet titling” of tax foreclosed properties. All property alterations and 
transactions have been documented in a GCLB database system, offering a rich opportunity to 
investigate the effectiveness of GCLB programs, including demolition of unsalvageable 
structures, rehabilitations and renovations, property management, property sales, and a 
foreclosure prevention and financial counseling program. 
 
As of the end of 2005, 435 structure demolitions have been completed by the GCLB. The GCLB 
has performed over thirty complete rehabilitations (as of summer’s end 2006) and has several 
more underway. Capital investment in the rehabilitation program reached roughly $700,000 in 
2005. During the 2002-2005 period, 275 GCLB properties were sold as sidelots (vacant lots sold 
for $1 to adjacent homeowners). In addition, the GCLB foreclosure prevention and financial 
counseling program has helped over 1,350 homeowners keep their homes. The GCLB is directly 
putting properties back into the property tax system through its several sales programs. In 2005, 
GCLB revenues from property sales exceeded $1 million county-wide, and GCLB realized over 
$100,000 income from its rental properties. When sidelot sales are included, the GCLB programs 
have generated over $100,000 in property tax revenues for Flint and Genesee County. In 2006 
alone, the additional property tax revenues from GCLB sales exceeded $68,000, and this amount 
is expected to recur annually. These are direct, quantifiable effects of GCLB programs. 
 
The impact of GCLB programs on the value of neighboring properties is an additional, indirect 
impact. The GCLB data on structure demolitions provides an opportunity to estimate this indirect 
effect of GCLB investments in structure demolitions. The demolition program creates vacant lots 
and reduces the number of abandoned structures, and the hedonic analysis provides estimates of 
the impacts of these structures and lots on nearby property values. These estimates were used to 
calculate the value of properties in proximity to demolition sites and to calculate the values of 
these properties in a counterfactual scenario in which the demolitions did not occur. 
 
The total positive impacts of the GCLB demolition program in Flint, as of the end of 2005, are 
estimated at more than $112 million. Given the roughly $3.5 million spent on demolitions during 
the 2002-2005 period, this suggests a net benefit of the demolition program in excess of $109 
5 
million. The hedonic model estimates suggest that the demolition program positively affects the 
values of more than 26,000 residential properties in Flint.  
 
This research can help new land banks across the State of Michigan measure the effects of their 
programs to estimate the return to public funds invested in their programs. This study shows that 
when urban areas are losing their population, industry, and desirable neighborhoods, they can 
protect their property values with demolition of abandoned structures and other programs made 
possible by the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Act.   
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 The Problem 
Many cities across the U.S. are grappling with the decline of their urban cores. Older industrial 
cities are especially hard hit, with economic and market forces resulting in job losses and 
population decline. Even in growing metropolitan areas, urban cores are eroded by suburban and 
exurban residential and commercial growth. Because of population shifts, high unemployment 
rates and weak real estate market conditions, many of these cities contain large tracks of 
unoccupied, abandoned residential structures and vacant lots. These properties attract crime, 
strain the resources of local police and fire departments, depreciate property values, and degrade 
the quality of surrounding neighborhoods. According to the Funders’ Network for Smart Growth 
and Livable Communities (2004), the U.S. Fire Administration reports that over 12,000 fires are 
reported in vacant structures each year, resulting in over $73 million in damages. Crime rates on 
blocks with open abandoned buildings have been found to be twice as high as rates on matched 
blocks without open buildings (Setterfield 1997).  Moreover, abandoned structures are often used 
for storage of drugs or stolen goods to be delivered later, prostitution, drug use, and garbage 
dumping (Funders’ Network 2004).  
 
Paradoxically, the lack of tax dollars that has cut police and firefighting forces is exacerbated by 
growing numbers of tax-foreclosed, vacant and abandoned properties that lower a municipal tax 
base. Abandoned properties generate no tax revenues and therefore decrease access to resources 
that help address the blight and crime they foster. Declining quality of neighborhoods diminishes 
demand for urban property and consequently decreases market values of nearby residential 
properties – compounding the problem of decreased tax revenues further. In many cities, the 
laws and regulations that define options for managing these properties have been made obsolete 
by the sheer volume of incoming tax foreclosed properties each year (Alexander 2005). Across 
the country, progressive community leaders are using new approaches to fight blight and 
abandonment in an attempt to rediscover value in forgotten urban lands. One such approach is 
the creation of land banks. 
1.2 Land Banks 
Since the early 1970’s, land banks have been created across the U.S. to convert vacant, 
abandoned, tax-delinquent properties into productive uses. In contrast to redevelopment 
authorities, which typically use taxing and eminent domain powers to develop or redevelop a 
particular location for a particular purpose, land banks address problems created by large 
quantities of privately-owned or public land not reclaimed or redeveloped by market forces 
because of financial, legal, or administrative barriers (Alexander 2005). Accordingly, cities that 
have used some version of the land bank model – for example, St. Louis, Cleveland, Louisville, 
Atlanta, and Flint – have all faced growing inventories of tax delinquent and abandoned 
properties in their commercial and residential urban centers. The forms and functions of these 
cities’ land banks differ. Some are legal, independent authorities while others are programs of 
municipal departments. The powers, policies, priorities and strategies for land use and reuse 
vary, depending upon each state’s constitutional law and differing divisions of power between 
state and local governments (Alexander 2005). Land bank property inventories are built through 
tax foreclosure procedures and donations of properties. Land banks manage properties (often for 
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affordable housing purposes), demolish or rehabilitate decrepit properties, and transfer title (or 
sell) properties for various redevelopment purposes. 
1.3 The Genesee County Land Bank and Flint, Michigan 
The Genesee County Land Bank (GCLB) is the most recently created land bank designed to 
address the tax delinquency and abandonment problem. Genesee County is home to the City of 
Flint, where the city’s reliance on a waning American automotive industry has combined with 
other economic and social factors to cause severe population and job loss, property 
abandonment, and decline in the quality of neighborhood environments, all of which are 
highlighted in the 1989 documentary film, Roger and Me, directed by Michael Moore.  
 
The 2000 U.S. Census estimates that over 12% of Flint’s housing stock is empty. With over 
44,000 residential properties in the City of Flint, this equates to over 5,000 residential housing 
units that are currently vacant or abandoned. Several GCLB property management programs are 
working in unison to restructure, redevelop, and recreate value in declining neighborhood 
environments across the city. During the 2002-2005 period, the land bank authority (originally 
the Land Reutilization Council) in Genesee County acquired roughly 2,000 abandoned lots and 
1,000 abandoned structures through legislated “fast track quiet titling” of tax foreclosed 
properties. All property alterations and transactions have been documented in a GCLB database 
system, offering a rich opportunity to investigate the effectiveness of GCLB programs, including 
demolition of unsalvageable structures, rehabilitations and renovations, property management, 
property sales, and a foreclosure prevention and financial counseling program. 
1.4 Overview of the Report 
Absent from GCLB progress is any comprehensive analysis of the economic and fiscal impacts 
of the program for Flint, Genesee County, or the State of Michigan. This study is a first step in 
filling that gap. First, the background for the study is provided, including a discussion of the 
evolution and extent of the property abandonment problem in Flint. Second, the institutional 
structure for dealing with tax delinquency and foreclosure in Michigan is reviewed, and activities 
of the GCLB as a response to the abandonment problem and its accomplishments are described. 
Next, one component of the costs of property abandonment problem is estimated – the impacts of 
foreclosure and abandonment on neighboring property values. Then, direct and indirect benefits 
associated with GCLB activities are described and, for the structure demolition program, a 
measure of indirect benefits is provided. Finally, implications of this study for policymakers and 
for future research are reviewed. 
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2.0 The Property Abandonment Problem 
As early as the 1970s, research on housing abandonment showed that public and private sector 
decisions significantly affect the levels of abandonment in urban areas. In the absence of a 
concerted effort to address abandonment problems, neighborhoods face a “spiral of blight” as 
homeowners in close proximity to abandoned properties face stagnant and declining property 
values and additional residents and businesses leave the area (National Vacant Properties 
Campaign 2005). In Flint, as in several other aging cities in the U.S., tax delinquency and 
property abandonment can be traced to a series of historical and contemporary micro- and 
macro-economic phenomena, policies, and events. Particularly important policies and events 
include the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression of the early- and mid-
1930s, the creation of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), the housing and economic pressures caused by World War II and the 
postwar era, and, for cities heavily reliant upon the automobile industry, birth of the labor 
unions, fluctuations in the oil industry, and, finally, declines in consumer demand for U.S. made 
automobiles. 
2.1 Urban Housing Economics and Policy 
The stock market crash in 1929, which started the Great Depression, dealt the housing industry 
and homeowners a crippling blow. By 1933 over half of all home mortgages in the U.S. were 
technically in default. In June of 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation (HOLC) into law to address the needs for urban housing. HOLC had an important 
effect on the housing industry because it introduced and perfected the self-amortizing mortgage 
with uniform payments spread over the life of the loan. Between 1933 and 1935, HOLC supplied 
more than $3 billion in aide for over one million mortgages – or one-tenth of non-farm 
residences in the U.S. HOLC also introduced a neighborhood quality rating system whose legacy 
affected federal lending through at least 1970 as well as the lending practices of private 
institutions to this day (Jackson 1985).   
 
The HOLC rating system was designed to value urban real estate as well as to give insight into 
future values of the land. Ratings of one through four were established with corresponding colors 
(1=green, 2=blue, 3=yellow, and 4=red). Real estate receiving the green grade was considered 
new, homogeneous (“American business and professional men”), and “in demand as residential 
locations in good times and bad”. Properties given the second, blue, grade were “still desirable”, 
but had “reached their peak”. Third grade properties were “definitely declining”, and the red 
fourth grade areas were those in which the third grade level of decline had occurred. African 
American neighborhoods were invariably given the fourth grade due to the apparent decline in 
property values from this racial difference (Hillier 2005). The standard practice of giving black 
neighborhoods red grades (or their being red-lined, as it is now labeled) was reinforced by a 
statistical model of neighborhood change produced in the 1930s at the University of Chicago 
which showed that initial African American families in white neighborhoods had to pay 
premiums to break the social barrier, and subsequently the neighborhoods would experience 
drastic declines in property values (Jackson 1985). Up until at least 1970, this data was being 
used by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to red line postal zip codes where race changes and 
diminished property values were present (Jackson 1985).   
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The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which provides mortgage insurance on loans made 
by FHA-approved lenders throughout the United States and its territories, was created in 1934 to 
stimulate private housing construction which did not rely on government spending. Similar to the 
loan practices of HOLC, the FHA came to be known for middle-class favoritism as a result of the 
format of their mortgage risk assessments. Unlike HOLC, the FHA “allowed personal and 
agency bias in favor of all-white subdivisions in the suburbs to affect the kinds of loans it 
guaranteed, or, equally important, refused to guarantee (Jackson 1985)”. In the decades 
following World War II, the federal government responded to the immediate need for housing by 
using its funds to underwrite the construction of five million new homes. The Veterans 
Administration (created in 1944 to facilitate re-entry of military personnel into civilian life) 
followed FHA standards in its home-lending programs (Jackson 1985). Private mortgage and 
real estate institutions invariably had (and still have) access to the HOLC and FHA assessments. 
With maps and data showing different property values and investment risk assessments based on 
race, discriminatory mortgage loan practices were inevitable, often with no mortgage loans 
available at all in urban African American neighborhoods (Jackson 1985).  
 
In northern industrial cities, the impacts of HOLC, FHA and private lending practices were 
exacerbated by racial migration patterns. These cities experienced soaring migration of African 
Americans during the 1940s who responded to the high availability of low-skilled manufacturing 
jobs, promise of economic prosperity, and common notions of more equal opportunities in the 
north. Simultaneously, urban areas experienced growing segregation as a result of the availability 
of guaranteed mortgages to white residents who moved into suburban areas. Although the sorting 
of families by income and color began before the Civil War, and was stimulated by the growth of 
the factory system, it was reinforced during this period. For example, the Levitt Organization, a 
large private land and housing development firm, publicly denied housing and land sales to 
African Americans for more than two decades after WWII (late 1940s through late 1960s) 
(Jackson 1985). 
 
Federal law (in 1975) and Michigan law (in 1978) sought to eliminate discriminatory home 
lending practices, but questions have remained about whether covert forms of redlining (also 
called predatory lending) continue, including higher interest rates, higher down payments, lower 
loan-to-value rates, and shorter loan maturity terms than necessary for comparable properties in 
other locations (Kantor and Nystuen 1982). In neighborhoods where potential and existing 
homeowners are unable to obtain mortgage credit, eventually the entire neighborhood succumbs 
to deterioration (Werner, Frej and Madway 1976).  A study conducted at the University of 
Michigan analyzed mortgage activity in Flint during 1978 and 1979 and concluded that “defacto 
redlining”, described as the outcome of a dynamic process in which cycles of housing market 
decisions create an accumulated effect on neighborhood quality, was occurring in Flint and was 
based on ethnic composition of the neighborhoods (Kantor and Nystuen 1982). 
2.2 Changes in the Automobile Industry 
Similar to the impacts of industrial decline in many cities, Flint’s dependence on the automobile 
industry contributed in a number of ways to its abandonment problems. The sit-down strike of 
1936-37 in Flint started the United Automobile Worker’s Union (UAW) and inaugurated the 
beginning of the labor union era. The bargaining power of unions has helped and hurt 
employment in the City of Flint. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) argue that the high labor costs 
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from UAW-bargained wages and benefits have caused major firms (GM included) to relocate 
and off-shore much of their factory capacity and production, consequently removing 
manufacturing jobs and population. Another major factor that has affected, and still affects, the 
automobile industry is the fluctuation of oil prices. The 1973 oil crisis caused a shock to the 
automobile industry resulting in major production and sales losses. Finally, demand for imported 
automobiles and those produced by U.S.-based foreign companies has removed a significant 
amount of market share from U.S. automobile companies.  
 
In November of 2005, GM announced plans for eliminating 30,000 jobs, along with nine plant 
closings, nationwide by 2008. Among jobs that are to be eliminated are the nearly 3,000 jobs at 
Flint’s Delphi (GM’s parts manufacturing) plant. The General Motors explanation is that it needs 
to align production to better fit global demand for its product, an essential variable to future 
profits.  According to the Associated Press, GM faced over $4 billion in losses in the 2005 
calendar year (Associated Press 2005).  
2.3 Flint in Transition 
Between 1910 and 1940, Flint’s population increased from fewer than 40,000 to over 150,000, 
and the African-American population grew accordingly, from fewer than 400 in 1910 to more 
than 6500 in 1940. Flint’s population continued to grow until it reached its peak of almost 
200,000 people in 1960, and black residents made up an increasingly large proportion of that 
total. Then, economic and social forces conspired, and an exodus began. However, it was the 
white population that left the city, while the black population continued to increase. The decadal 
change in Flint’s white and black population is shown in figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1 Decadal Population Change in Flint, Michigan, by Race, 1900-2000 
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Changes in Flint’s housing stock and tenure mirrored population changes, although the U.S. 
Census did not collect and report housing census data until 1960. Table 2.1 shows total number 
of housing units in Flint, 1960-2000. Also shown is a breakdown of owners and renters by race. 
Despite the fact that African-Americans represented more than 54% of Flint’s population in 
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2000, they represented fewer than 43% of homeowners and more than 57% of renters. Table 2.1 
also shows the number of vacant housing units during the period. This number includes units that 
are available for sale or rent, as well as units characterized by the U.S. Census as “other vacant”. 
Table 2.1 Housing Stock and Tenure by Race, Flint, Michigan, 1960-2000 
Year Total 
units 
White 
owner-
occupied 
Black 
owner- 
occupied 
White 
renter-
occupied 
Black 
renter-
occupied 
Vacant 
Units 
1960 62275 38303 4546 11850 3893 3683 
1970 64245 33576 8440 12740 5889 3261 
1980 60976 25905 11899 10274 8467 3328 
1990 58724 19119 11632 10364 11700 4830 
2000 55464 15382 12252 7530 11484 6720 
 
Based upon its growing population during the first half of the century, Flint in 1965 produced a 
city master plan that helped to build infrastructure for the 250,000 residents expected in coming 
years (Kildee 2004). However, social and economic realities clashed with the hopes of Flint’s 
decision makers, and declines in economic opportunities, population and public infrastructure 
have characterized the last three decades for the city. GM employment in Flint peaked in 1978 at 
around 80,000 employees, but fewer than 17,000 GM jobs remain (Beckley 2005). Today, Flint 
is a city left behind, with a population of less than 119,000, facing a weak real estate market and 
major unemployment problems (13.7% average for 2005), and riddled with abandoned and tax-
foreclosed properties. 
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3.0 The Genesee County Response to Tax Delinquency and 
Property Abandonment 
According to Alexander (2005), one of the most significant barriers to managing property 
abandonment and neighborhood decline issues associated with high volumes of tax-delinquency 
is the large amount of time required to foreclose upon a property. Prior to 1999 (and even after 
the 1999 change in laws, as we shall see shortly), Michigan communities faced significant 
redevelopment impediments because of its tax delinquency laws and the legislated process, and 
time period, required for tax foreclosure and clearing of titles. The Genesee County Land 
Reutilization Council (LRC, the predecessor entity to the Genesee County Land Bank) was 
created when a 1999 legislative change in Michigan enabled local governments to reduce the 
time required to conduct foreclosures and provided tools for managing foreclosed properties.  
3.1 Michigan’s Institutional Structure for Addressing Property 
Abandonment 
Before 1999, when property taxes were not paid, the property owner had until March 1 of the 
following tax year before the taxes were considered delinquent, at which point the owner became 
liable for delinquency fees, penalties, and interest on the unpaid balance. Upon 26 months of 
delinquency, the property would be subject to a tax lien sale where a buyer could purchase a lien 
on the delinquent taxes due on the property. The purchase price of a lien was the total amount of 
delinquent taxes, interest, and fees due on the property for the delinquent tax year(s).  Upon 
payment of taxes (redemption) by the original owner, the lien holder was entitled to any 
delinquent taxes and fees paid on the property plus 1.25% per month interest on delinquent taxes, 
and any administrative fees paid to obtain the lien. If delinquent taxes were not paid by the 
original owner within one year, then the lien holder could choose to take ownership of the 
property (and had up to five years to do so).1 Most lien holders had no interest in ownership of 
the properties, but were solely interested in gains on their investments created when the original 
owner paid the delinquent taxes, fees, and 1.25% interest. 
 
When properties were not redeemed (taxes not repaid) and lien holders were not interested in 
purchasing the property, the property eventually reverted to the Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR), which retained it as a state property, returned it to the local unit of 
government, or sold it to private interests. Prior to 1996, the state was required to find and notify 
all potentially affected parties, both recorded and non-recorded property interests, before taking 
ownership of a foreclosed property.2 A 1996 change in state law limited notice requirements to 
only recorded interests. However, questions about clear title and problems obtaining title 
insurance often were not resolved, creating disincentives for private purchase of foreclosed 
properties. The entire process, from tax delinquency through foreclosure to change in title, took a 
                                                 
1 This process was referred to as perfecting the lien. One year after purchasing the tax lien, the lien holder would be 
sent a tax deed. The purchaser could perfect the lien by filing a proof of the tax deed with the county sheriff. The 
sheriff would serve notice to all recorded property interests that a request to perfect the lien had been claimed, and, 
barring any further action after that notice, the lienholder would be issued a deed to the property. 
2 A Michigan Supreme Court Decision (Dow v. Michigan 396 Mich. 192) in 1976 required that all property interests, 
not just those that were recorded, be notified of potential foreclosure, which could require considerable time and 
expense.  
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minimum of five years and often much longer (Citizens Research Council of Michigan 1999). 
(This lengthy and complicated process is explained in detail by Citizens Research Council of 
Michigan (1999).) 
 
Because a property could go to multiple tax lien sales if taxes remained delinquent, over time 
multiple individuals could hold liens on one property. According to the pre-1999 Michigan tax-
delinquency laws, any lien holder could purchase title to the delinquent property one year after 
the lien was originally purchased. If multiple lien holders had this option, purchase of title would 
require that all prior liens be paid. This also made obtaining clear title to the properties extremely 
difficult (Citizens Research Council 1999), reducing the likelihood that such properties would 
return to private ownership.  
3.1.1 Property Tax Law Amendments in 1999 
Amendments to Michigan’s general property tax act in 1999 (PA 123 of 1999) reflected 
Michigan’s initial attempt to simplify the tax reversion process and provide opportunity for local 
governments to put tax foreclosed properties back into productive use. PA 123 (and associated 
acts passed at the same time) made several significant changes to the tax delinquency, 
foreclosure and title transfer process. First, counties could choose to become the “foreclosing 
governmental unit”, meaning that at foreclosure the county would become the property owner 
instead of the state. Second, the period of time a property could remain tax delinquent before 
actual foreclosure was reduced from 40-46 months to approximately 25 months. Also, penalties 
accrued during that period were reduced to encourage owners to pay delinquent taxes. In 
addition, counties could certify certain tax delinquent properties as “abandoned property for 
accelerated forfeiture” which reduced the foreclosure process by one year.  
 
Third, tax lien sales were eliminated for tax years 1999 and beyond. Instead, judicial title 
clearing and foreclosure proceedings were conducted and then the property could be put up for 
sale. Fourth, counties were allowed to attach additional fees to delinquent taxes to cover title 
searches and other administrative costs. Finally, the new law gave county treasurers the option to 
postpone foreclosure if taxes were delinquent because a property owner faced “substantial 
financial hardship.” (These changes are described in Citizens Research Council of Michigan 
2000). However, these changes did not apply to the backlog of properties that became tax 
delinquent prior to 1999. Additionally, legislative analysis in 2003 noted that the 1999 law 
afforded inadequate protection to property owners and often resulted in a title of questionable 
legal value (Hunault 2003), and the period between tax delinquency and tax foreclosure 
continued to be as long as five or six years in many cases. 
3.1.2 Michigan’s Land Bank Fast Track Act of 2004 
With the encouragement of Governor Jennifer Granholm’s Land Use Leadership Council 
(LULC) and the leadership of LULC member Daniel Kildee, Genesee County treasurer, the 
Michigan Legislature responded to chronic problems associated with managing tax delinquency 
and passed the Land Bank Fast Track Act (PA 258) and a series of associated bills which were 
signed into law January 5, 2004. This series of laws enabled the establishment of land bank 
authorities by cities and counties that could acquire, assemble, quiet title to and dispose of tax-
reverted (and other) property to make them available more quickly for return to private 
ownership and productive use. In addition, the laws provided methods for land banks to generate 
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revenue to fund their operations. Funding sources authorized include tax increment financing 
under the Brownfield Redevelopment Act, bonding, and the return to the land bank of one-half 
of revenues from a specific tax levied on properties sold by the land bank. After a property is 
conveyed by a land bank, a tax reverted property specific tax is levied on the property for five 
years, with 50% of the specific tax distributed to the land Bank and 50% distributed to the local 
taxing jurisdictions. Finally, properties held by land banks are exempted from general property 
taxes (Richards 2006). The new laws also allowed for the transfer from the state to the land bank 
of any tax reverted properties to which the state held title. Upon passage of PA 258, the GCLB 
was created in 2004.   
3.2 Genesee County Land Bank Financing and Operations 
Specific GCLB programs include rehabilitating homes that are believed to possess value, 
demolishing of structures that are deemed unsafe and irreversibly dilapidated, cleaning and 
maintaining vacant lots and structures, maintaining rental housing with an option for renters to 
buy, creating land contract and lease-to-own opportunities, foreclosure prevention, and 
facilitating development and redevelopment programs. Financing of the GCLB comes largely 
from penalties on delinquent tax payments made each tax year in Genesee County. In the first 
three years of the program, upwards of $4 million was generated from these penalties and fees 
for the GCLB budget. Other land bank financing comes from a brownfield redevelopment plan 
which generates tax increment revenues to reimburse a $5 million brownfield bond, $2.2 million 
in EPA grants, as well as sales of tax foreclosed properties that have sufficient value to transition 
into the private land and housing market (Beckley 2005). Operating expenses for fiscal year 
2005 totaled $3.4 million, with roughly $1.15 million coming from property sales and rental 
income. The remaining funds came from $740,000 in tax penalty fees, $1.5 million from the 
brownfield redevelopment bond, and $187,000 from the EPA grant, leaving net assets of roughly 
$200,000 at the end of the 2005 fiscal year.   
 
The land banking program in Genesee County represents a successful effort to manage the 
burden associated with the large volume of tax-foreclosed properties in Flint. Examples of this 
success include the clearing of property titles to over 3,500 tax-foreclosed properties, the return 
of over 650 tax-foreclosed properties to private ownership and the property tax rolls, and 
reducing the risks of property tax delinquency among private property owners through 
preventing the foreclosure of over 1,350 homes.  
 
Exactly how does the GCLB function in Flint and Genesee County? Each year in Flint, between 
700 and 1000 properties3 are tax-delinquent for a second year and are subsequently foreclosed 
upon by the Genesee County Treasurer. These properties immediately come under the 
management of the GCLB, at which point the title of each property is held in a grace period until 
the occurrence of the several foreclosed property auctions in Genesee County each year. During 
this grace period, GCLB staff surveys and photographs each property to gain an understanding of 
each foreclosed property’s current status. Ultimately, the goal of the GCLB is to put these tax-
foreclosed properties back into productive use and back onto the tax rolls. Several options exist 
for the disposition of tax foreclosed properties before GCLB takes ownership. (These options are 
illustrated in figures 3.1 and 3.2). The State of Michigan is first in line to take ownership of any  
                                                 
3 All numbers in this section were obtained from the Genesee County Land Bank database, which is updated 
regularly at the Genesee County Treasurer’s Office. 
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Figure 3.1 Disposition of Tax Delinquent Properties in Genesee County, MI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Disposition of Genesee County Land Bank Inventory of Residential 
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property that has been foreclosed upon. If the State does not choose to take ownership, local 
municipalities and then the county can take ownership. If one of these authorities takes 
ownership, the property must be put to a public use (a public park, for example) and is exempt 
from property tax payments.   
 
As a result of the changes in property tax laws, tax lien sales no longer occur. However, tax-
foreclosed properties are still made available for purchase at public auction. The GCLB is able to 
make several management decisions for properties before they go to auction. First, the GCLB 
partners with the Genesee County Treasurer’s office in a foreclosure postponement and financial 
counseling program. Since its inception in 2002, this program has helped over 1,350 
homeowners keep their homes (Beckley 2005). This program is used when the GCLB judges that 
owners want to stay and are invested in their neighborhoods but simply cannot afford to pay their 
taxes. With this program, properties subject to foreclosure due to lack of property tax payments 
stay under the ownership and control of the current owners. Budget and financial counseling is 
provided in an attempt to help owners recover from their tax debt and continue to pay taxes on 
their properties into the future.   
 
The second, and most powerful, step that the LBFTA has made possible for the GCLB is the 
bundling program. The GCLB has the regulatory authority to bundle properties, which translates 
into the packaging of all the lowest quality non-adjacent structures and lots in Genesee County 
(including Flint) that are foreclosed upon into one bundle. These bundles then go to auction. 
However, the bundling makes the minimum bid (back taxes owed on all properties in the bundle) 
higher than speculators are generally willing to pay. In January of the year following the auction, 
titles for properties which are not sold for minimum bid revert to GCLB ownership, and the 
GCLB can carefully manage the disposition of each property. 
 
Of the roughly 3,000 properties the GCLB has taken title to during the 2002-2005 period, over 
80% have been acquired because of the bundling process. Therefore, the bundling capability 
guarantees that the glut of low-end property in the city will be owned and managed by the GCLB 
– creating more public certainty about the disposition of these properties over time. Public 
ownership of these properties assures neighborhood residents that the GCLB will manage them, 
as well as attempt to put them back into a productive use. In a sense, this makes the GCLB a 
benevolent owner of the worst property in the city with the intent of making the property useful, 
productive and taxable. Because of liabilities associated with owning low-end housing, the 
GCLB spent over $40,000 on property insurance in FY 2005.   
 
Technically the GCLB could bundle all tax-foreclosed properties and take title to each of them at 
no cost. This creates a potential conflict of interest for the land bank because properties which 
would have been sold at auction before the GCLB existed can be captured by the GCLB for free.  
To avoid this dilemma, the GCLB will pay minimum bid (before a property goes to auction) to 
acquire any property it believes still holds value. Of the roughly 3,000 properties the GCLB has 
taken title to between 2002 and 2005, about 20% were obtained in this way. Many of these 
properties will be renovated and sold or leased with an option to buy, furthering the GCLB goal 
of creating positive home investment and preserving private home ownership within Flint. 
Several things are accomplished when the GCLB pays minimum bid: (1) tax revenues are added 
to the city and county treasury; (2) tenants who were renting from a delinquent owner may be 
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able to stay in their homes and actually have the option to buy them; (3) properties with value are 
renovated, creating more value for surrounding properties and a higher quality neighborhood 
environment.   
 
Ideally, the GCLB would manage the disposition of all tax-foreclosed properties to create 
certainty for redevelopment purposes. However, because of GCLB budget issues, the decision is 
sometimes made to allow properties to be auctioned individually. Between 2002 and 2005, 
nearly 200 properties were presented for auction to private non-GCLB affiliated citizens. 
Between 40 and 70 properties were sold at auction each year for minimum bid (back taxes 
owed). While these sales generate revenue for the GCLB, the future use of these properties is 
uncertain. It is common for these properties to be purchased by speculators, and many eventually 
are foreclosed upon again once the owners determine that abandonment is preferable to 
continuing property tax payments. The properties that don’t sell at auction revert to the GCLB 
anyway. 
 
After the auction, the GCLB has several property management and alteration initiatives in place 
to meet its objective of putting properties back into productive use. The two most powerful 
programs the GCLB implements to increase the quality of neighborhood environments are the 
demolition and sidelot programs. These programs change the physical face of neighborhood 
environments and future land use opportunities in neighborhoods throughout Flint. The decision 
to demolish a structure is based on assessments made by GCLB staff. These assessments 
determine whether the structure is salvageable or is a danger to the health of neighborhood 
residents and their property values. As of the end of summer 2006, nearly 700 demolitions have 
been completed by the GCLB. (For the analysis reported in the next section, the 435 demolitions 
which occurred during 2002-2005 were used). Upon completion of structure demolitions, vacant 
lots fall under the umbrella of several other GCLB property management programs. 
 
The sidelot program is one of the most immediately influential programs the GCLB implements. 
This program addresses vacant lots that are adjacent to occupied residential structures. With the 
goal of creating a sustainable neighborhood environment where property is well managed and 
maintained, this program makes vacant lots available for purchase by adjacent residential 
property owners for $1. Subsequently, residential yards are larger and the sidelot parcels are 
better maintained. During the 2002-2005 period, 275 GCLB properties were sold as sidelots.  
Although lots are acquired for $1, they are assessed at their market rate, resulting in direct 
returns to the property tax rolls.  
 
When neighboring residents are not interested in the sidelot program, or the GCLB believes the 
vacant lot holds potential future value for other developments, the property falls under one of 
two property maintenance programs. These maintenance programs also maintain the yards of any 
structures owned by the GCLB. The Clean and Green (CG) property maintenance program 
creates incentives for residents in abandonment-affected neighborhoods to maintain and manage 
the physical and visual attributes of abandoned properties in their immediate area. The CG 
program started as a pilot project during the summer of 2003 when two community groups 
partnered in the maintenance of 45 GCLB-owned properties on Flint's east side. Of these 45 
properties, ten were improved with decorative split rail fencing and raised garden beds. During 
the summer of 2005, six more community groups participated in the program, and an additional 
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six groups joined in the summer of 2006. These groups maintained over 520 GCLB properties 
and developed 12 greening projects. The GCLB compensates participants with $40 per lot 
maintained per maintenance ‘round’, of which there are five between June 1 and September 30 
each year. Neighborhood groups apply on a project-by-project basis competitively and must 
maintain a minimum of 25 properties and a maximum of 100 properties over the specified time 
period (Genesee County Land Bank 2006). 
 
All GCLB-owned properties require maintenance in order to address public safety concerns, 
protect the structural integrity of buildings, and improve the quality of neighborhood 
environments. In July 2003, the GCLB entered into an agreement with a local community 
development corporation to clean, maintain and board the balance of GCLB properties beyond 
the 520 properties maintained through the Clean and Green Program. The contractual property 
maintenance system is currently being upgraded and expanded to meet the increasing demands 
associated with the growing inventory of GCLB properties (Genesee County Land Bank 2006).  
In FY 2005, over $500,000 was spent on maintenance and repairs. 
 
Another GCLB program which significantly impacts neighborhood environments is the 
structural rehabilitation program. The GCLB has performed over thirty complete rehabilitations 
(as of summer’s end 2006) and has several more underway. The motto of the program is, “we 
turn the worst house on the block into the best house on the block (Mitchell 2006).” The 
managers of this program report that the program has changed behavior and property values in 
several neighborhoods across Flint. Capital investment in the rehabilitation program reached 
roughly $700,000 in 2005. These funds are generated outside the regular GCLB budget by a 
county-level revolving loan system. Construction crews are hired by the GCLB rehab program 
staff on a competitive bid basis to rebuild structures that are chosen strategically. Rehabilitated 
homes are chosen based on structural integrity, as well as a judgment call by GCLB planners as 
to whether the health of the neighborhood’s housing market is in transition. If the neighborhood 
is near a tipping point of decline and blight, it may receive priority for rehabilitations to avoid 
tipping the neighborhood into decline. 
 
The Brownfield Redevelopment Program is dedicated to securing state and federal resources to 
facilitate the cleanup and redevelopment of blighted and contaminated properties. The GCLB is 
currently managing two EPA grants: a $200,000 EPA Site Assessment grant to complete 
necessary environmental assessments on commercial and industrial tax-foreclosed properties and 
position them for re-use, and a $2 million Brownfield Revolving Loan Fund Grant to support the 
cleanup of environmentally-contaminated sites. Moreover, the GCLB is using $5 million of bond 
funds for demolition projects and other eligible brownfield activities. The bond funds are 
reimbursed using brownfield tax increment revenues from the Brownfield Plan, including 
roughly 2000 GCLB properties developed under the authority of the Michigan Brownfield 
Redevelopment Financing Act (PA 381). The GCLB brownfield program staff also serves as 
staff to the Genesee County Brownfield Redevelopment Authority (Genesee County Land Bank 
2006). 
 
The GCLB is directly putting properties back into the tax system through its several sales 
programs. In 2005, GCLB revenues from property sales exceeded $1 million county-wide, and 
GCLB realized over $100,000 income from its rental properties. When sidelot sales are included, 
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the GCLB programs have generated over $100,000 in property tax revenues for Flint and 
Genesee County. In 2006 alone, the additional property tax revenues from GCLB sales exceeded 
$68,000, and this amount is expected to recur annually. Also, many properties have been sold by 
the GCLB since the end of the 2006 tax year, and will be taxed in 2007, adding to increased 
property tax revenues. As of the 2006 tax year, over $1.17 million in property value has been put 
back into Flint’s property tax system by GCLB programs. 
 
Programs which earmark where these tax revenues will be spent have been established in PA 258 
and PA 381. Of tax revenues generated by properties sold by the GCLB that are included in the 
Brownfield Redevelopment Plan, 100% is put towards payments taken out of the brownfield 
bond for 5 years. Tax revenues generated by non-brownfield plan properties are divided, with 
50% paid directly to the GCLB for operating costs and bond payments and 50% paid to the 
County for distribution to local taxing jurisdictions. This is referred to as the ‘five-fifty’ program.  
At the end of five years all revenues from these properties go to the County for distribution to 
local jurisdictions.      
 
The final GCLB program is its development program. The GCLB is dedicated to returning 
properties to the tax rolls while supporting smart urban growth. The GCLB development staff is 
responsible for identifying development opportunities for GCLB-owned properties, creating 
plans, devising a strategy for accomplishing goals and seeing the development through to 
completion. Currently, several projects are underway, including scattered site in-fill, multi-
family condominium development, joint-venture rehabilitation programs with mixed use 
commercial reconstruction, and single-family construction (Genesee County Land Bank 2006).  
Current GCLB development projects include over 100 units of housing, both market rate and 
affordable, as well as the development of over 30,000 square feet of commercial/retail space. In 
these circumstances, the GCLB development staff collaborates with private development firms.  
Expenditures for major development projects currently underway are projected to be around $20 
million of combined public and private funds.  
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4.0 Effects of Property Abandonment on Property Values in 
Flint 
The challenges arising from widespread property abandonment and tax delinquency are varied 
and well-documented (National Vacant Properties Campaign 2005). One measurable impact of 
abandonment is the decline in property values associated with declining neighborhood quality 
when abandonment occurs. The value impacts of property abandonment on nearby housing can 
measured using a hedonic property value model, which estimates the marginal implicit value of 
structural and neighborhood environmental characteristics associated with residential housing.  
 
Taylor (2003) suggests the following thought experiment to understand hedonic theory: 
  
"Imagine the following hypothetical scenario in which there are two identical 
lakes, each with 100 identical homes surrounding them.  All homes are lakefront, 
and all the characteristics of the homes themselves, the land, and the 
neighborhoods are identical across the properties.  At the current equilibrium 
price of $200,000 per house, all 200 homes on either lake are equally preferred.  
Now, let’s imagine the water clarity at one lake, Lake A for example, is 
improved.  We assume that the improved water quality is preferred by all 
households.  Now if any home on Lake A were offered at the original equilibrium 
price of $200,000, consumers would uniformly prefer this house to any house on 
Lake B.  In other words, at the current prices, there would be excess demand for 
the houses located on Lake A, and as such, the price of these houses must rise to 
bring the market into equilibrium.  The price differential that results from the 
change in water clarity at Lake A is the implicit price consumers are willing to 
pay for that incremental increase in water clarity.  This willingness to pay for 
water clarity is indirectly revealed to us through the market prices of the homes.  
For instance, if in the new equilibrium, houses on Lake A sell for $210,000, while 
houses at Lake B sell for $200,000, the "implicit price" associated with the 
increased water clarity is $10,000 (p. 332)." 
 
To apply the hedonic model, an accurate measure of property abandonment at the neighborhood 
level is needed. The measurement challenge for this study is two-fold. First, negative effects on 
property values are likely a function of the problems that stem from abandoned housing, rather 
than the abandonment per se.  Measuring the level of these problems in neighborhoods is quite 
difficult. However, the location and number of abandoned properties surrounding residential 
homes can be used as a proxy for the level of these disamenity characteristics.   
 
Second, there is no comprehensive source of data on location and number of abandoned 
properties in Flint. Indeed, there is no generally agreed upon definition of abandonment (Bassett, 
Schweitzer and Panken 2006). Bassett et al. describe various studies that have defined 
abandonment as both a process and an end state. For example, abandonment may be viewed as 
an end state in which a property is chronically vacant, is imminently dangerous and in need of 
demolition, or is forfeited. Others view it as a process of deterioration, a process of withdrawal 
from or disinvestment in a property, or a failure to take active steps to bring a property to the real 
estate market.  
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The widespread existence of tax delinquency has been identified as a precursor to residential 
abandonment (Sternlieb and Burchell 1972-73). Accordingly, Alexander (2005) defines 
abandonment as a scenario in which, “the owner has ceased to invest any resources in the 
property, is foregoing all routine maintenance, and is making no further payments on related 
financial obligations such as mortgages or property taxes.” Following Alexander’s definition, 
this study uses tax foreclosure as a measure of abandonment, since failure to pay property taxes 
for at least two years is consistent with the cessation in investments and payments that 
characterizes abandonment. Because of the Genesee County Land Bank (GCLB), the location of 
every tax foreclosed property in the city of Flint is known. In addition, deterioration 
characteristic with abandonment is evident among tax foreclosed properties. In 2006, 995 
properties became foreclosed in the City of Flint. Of these 995 properties, 359 (~36%) were 
structures. According to the GCLB demolition coordinator, approximately 70% of those 
structures have been slated for demolition. 
4.1 Measuring Disamenity Effects on Property Values 
An extensive literature assesses the value implications of perceived hazards or disamenities for 
neighboring properties (Chattopadhyay, Braden and Patunru 2005; Deaton 2002; Farber 1998; 
Ihlanfeldt and Taylor 2004; McMillan 2004; Smith and Desvousges 1986). The majority of these 
studies incorporate a distance-to-hazard measure which is intended to account for any variation 
in perceived exposure to a given hazard. Human perceptions of exposure to an environmental 
hazard are assumed to decrease as distance between the hazard and people is increased (Deaton 
2002).  
 
A limited number of studies has addressed the property value impacts of urban decline. Simons, 
Quercia and Maric (1998) examined the effect of neighborhood decline and redevelopment in 
Cleveland, Ohio. They used sustained tax delinquency to measure decline and subsidized new 
residential construction to measure redevelopment. The effect of a change in these neighborhood 
variables was estimated using a two stage hedonic model of 12,100 residential sales in Cleveland 
from 1992-94. The proximity to hazard variable incorporated in their hedonic model was 
generated by counting the number of tax delinquent properties on a “map book page” (one to two 
block area) where a home was sold. The weighted tax-delinquency variable was found to be 
negatively related to sales price and was statistically significant in all models they tested 
(Simons, Quercia and Maric 1998). The estimated value decrease for a 1% increase in tax-
delinquency on a “map book page” was $778 per housing unit.   
 
These findings were reinforced by a more recent study assessing the value impacts of vacant 
structures in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This hedonic study used 14,526 sales within the city of 
Philadelphia in the year 2000. For their distance-to-hazard variable, researchers used binary 
variables to measure vacancy in two different ways: (1) a binary variable to indicate whether or 
not a vacant residential structure existed within given distances to properties which sold during 
the specified time period, and (2) 11 binary variables which indicated whether none, one, two, 
three, or up to ten, vacant structures existed on a block. They found that the presence of a vacant 
residential property within 0-150 feet decreased housing values by $7,627, within 150-299 feet 
decreased housing values by $6,819, and between 300 and 449 feet decreased housing value by 
$3,542. Beyond 450 feet, the presence of a vacant residential housing unit had no significant 
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effect on the value of housing (Research for Democracy 2001). The first distance-to-hazard 
proxy used in the Philadelphia study is problematic because the binary variable indicating a 
vacant property within a given distance does not account for the potential effects of multiple 
vacant housing units within the distance. Rather, the binary variable takes a value of one 
regardless of whether there is one vacant structure or several within the given distance. Thus, 
different effects in areas of high and low density abandonment are not accounted for. When 
multiple binary variables are present, meaningful interpretations of coefficients for these 
variables becomes difficult. 
 
This study extends the Cleveland and Philadelphia research in three ways. First, because the 
GCLB has maintained a database which contains the physical land status and geographic 
location of all tax-foreclosures between 2002 and 2005, the exact location of each tax-foreclosed 
property within Flint is known. In addition, the proximity of each foreclosure to the 6,368 
properties which sold between 2002 and 2005 within the City of Flint can be determined. This 
allows for the creation of a precise abandonment measurement which has not been available in 
previous studies. 
 
Second, because the GCLB database tracks changes in the status of abandoned properties over 
time, results of the hedonic analysis can be used to show the individual property value impacts 
caused by abandoned structures and vacant lots separately. Third, a specific program of the 
GCLB is demolition, namely turning abandoned structures into vacant lots. Tracking 
geographically where these demolitions have taken place over time provides an opportunity to 
estimate the effects of the GCLB demolition program in the hedonic analysis because of its 
impact on the number of abandoned structures and vacant lots in Flint neighborhoods.      
 
If the level of disamenities associated with abandoned structures and vacant lots can be measured 
correctly, a hedonic pricing model can be specified to examine the extent that disamenities are 
reflected in the prices of neighboring properties (Deaton 2002). Variables associated with the 
hedonic price function typically fall into one of two categories. The most critical are the physical 
features of the house such as lot size, square footage, age of house, number of bathrooms and 
bedrooms, or other variables descriptive of the physical house and property. The other set of 
attributes includes neighborhood characteristics such as neighborhood income levels, crime rates, 
school quality, racial composition, poverty rate, distance from important destinations, and 
environmental measures such as proximity to hazards (Haab and McConnell 2002).   
 
For this study, the hedonic price function is specified so that the sale price of a particular house 
is explained as a function of:  
• the number of abandoned single- and multi-family residential structures within the 
proximities of 0-500 feet, 501-1000 feet, and 1001-1500 feet to the house; 
• the number of vacant residential lots within the proximities of 0-500 feet, 501-1000 feet, 
and 1001-1500 feet to the house; 
• the physical attributes of the house; 
• the year and quarter in which the house sold (e.g. first quarter of 2002); and 
• the census tract in which the house is located. 
 
26 
A more detailed description of the hedonic theory and model and econometric analysis is 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
Of particular interest is the price effect associated with the density of abandoned residential 
single- and multi-family structures and vacant lots within the 0-500 foot, 501-1000 foot, and 
1001-1500 foot proximities to sale observations. These abandoned structure and vacant lot 
variables reflect the number of tax-foreclosed residential structures and vacant lots within their 
respective distances from sale observations and are used as proxy measures for exposure to the 
perceived disamenities associated with close proximity to abandoned and vacant property.  
Higher levels of foreclosed properties nearby are expected to increase exposure to abandonment 
and vacancy and, thus, result in lower sale prices. 
 
Increases in the number of bedrooms, bathrooms (Li and Brown 1980), basement area, garage 
area (Simons, Quercia, and Maric 1998), and lot frontage and depth (Kain and Quigeley 1970) of 
a home are expected to increase housing prices, all else constant. This is consistent with the 
standard assumption that more space is desirable (Deaton 2002).   
 
A set of binary variables is used to indicate the year and quarter during which a housing unit was 
sold. These time variables are expected to capture any changes in the value of housing over time, 
accounting for factors such as inflation or other fluctuations in the general housing market.  
Since annual rates of inflation are expected to be positive over time, houses that sell in later time 
periods would be expected to sell for higher prices than houses that sell in earlier time periods, 
all else constant. 
 
A second set of binary variables is included to indicate the census tracts in which housing sales 
were located throughout the City of Flint over the specified time period. These variables were 
included in the model to account for any neighborhood environmental attributes that are unique 
to a particular census tract, such as income level, crime rate, school quality, and other attributes 
that vary systematically across neighborhoods. Census tracts with lower incomes and higher 
levels of disamenity characteristics are expected to have lower housing sales prices, while areas 
with higher incomes and lower levels of disamenity characteristics are expected to have higher 
housing sales prices. 
4.2 Area of Study 
The city of Flint, Michigan encompasses a land area of roughly 34.1 square miles with an 
estimated total population 118,551 (U.S. Census). Compared to Michigan as a whole, Flint’s 
income levels and property values are much lower. The median price asked for a house in Flint 
in 2000 was $36,100, while the median price asked for a house statewide was $88,400 (U.S. 
Census). Median household income in Flint was $28,015 in 2000; the median household income 
statewide was $44,667 (U.S. Census). The 2000 Census reported 6,720 vacant housing units in 
Flint, and nearly 1,000 residential properties in Flint are tax-foreclosed each year. At the time of 
the 2000 U.S. Census, over 12% of the housing stock was vacant within the city. Comparing the 
2000 and 2005 city population estimates, an estimated 6,400 additional people left the city of 
Flint during that time period, certainly increasing the vacancy rate (U.S Census). 
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4.3 Data Collection 
Data for residential housing sales and associated structural characteristics of each house that sold 
during the 2002-2005 period were collected from the Flint Assessor’s office (FAO). Sales 
categorized as sheriff sales, quit-claim deeds, and any other non-conventional sales were omitted 
from the sales data used to estimate the hedonic price function. Residential property sales 
included in the model are conventional, or arms length sales, which include land contract and 
warranty deed sales, according to the FAO.   
 
The four years (January 2002 – December 2005) of sales and foreclosures for Flint were split 
into 16 quarterly time periods. These time periods were created for two reasons: (1) each year 
700-1000 additional tax foreclosed properties were added to the total inventory of tax-foreclosed 
properties in Flint, and (2) the status of tax-foreclosed properties could change over time due to 
GCLB actions. These changes in the status of tax-foreclosed properties mean that the 
environment surrounding residential property sales was changing with time and because of the 
implementation of GCLB programs. A snapshot of where residential housing sales occurred 
during the fourth quarter of 2005 compared to where property abandonment was located in Flint 
during that time period is shown in figure 4.1    
Figure 4.1. Location of Residential Property Sales Contrasted with Location 
of Abandonment in Flint, Michigan: 2005, 4th Quarter 
 
 
A Geographic Information System (GIS) was used to create several of the variables included in 
the hedonic price function. Using GIS, along with the GCLB database and the FAO database, 
each property that was either tax-foreclosed or sold in or after 2002 within the City of Flint was 
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geographically located. Then a multiple buffers4 query was conducted to measure the number of 
tax-foreclosed properties located within concentric distance circles surrounding each residential 
property sale. A visual explanation of how these variables were measured is provided in 
Appendix B. Also using GIS, each housing sale was assigned to a specific census tract in order 
to capture unobservable region-specific characteristics. The census tract variable divides Flint 
into roughly 40 geographic census tract regions. 
 
The mean and standard deviation of the dependent and explanatory variables are provided in 
table 4.1 (except for the regional census tract variables which are provided in Appendix A). The 
mean housing price for sales included in this study is high relative to citywide housing values for 
Flint. The range of values is also high. A possible explanation is that lower-valued housing tends 
to sell less often, as it is associated with disamenity characteristics like arson, crime, and lower 
overall neighborhood quality. Another possible explanation is that a few houses sold for more 
than $300,000 between 2002 and 2005, skewing the data and increasing the mean and variance. 
Appendix C contains a histogram showing the entire range of prices for residential properties 
sold in Flint from January 2002 through December 2005. 
 
The values shown in table 4.1 indicate that, on average, each house sold was characterized by 
fewer than one tax-foreclosed structure within 500 feet, just over one such structure between 501 
and 1000 feet away, and almost two such structures between 1001 and 1500 feet away. On 
average, each house sold was characterized by fewer than one vacant lot within 500 feet, almost 
two vacant lots between 501 and 1000 feet, and more than three vacant lots between 1001 an 
1500 feet away. The means of the time period variables are interpreted in this way: 6.3% of the 
sales in the 2002-2005 period occurred in the first quarter of 2002, 7% of the sales occurred in 
the second quarter of 2002, etc. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate the hedonic price function. Table 
4.2 presents the estimated coefficients, which were largely consistent with expectations. The 
estimated hedonic price function explained 56.2% of the variation in sales prices over the 
specified time period. Coefficients for structural housing characteristics were all highly 
statistically significant. The number of bedrooms and bathrooms in the hedonic price function 
account for living space and were both found to be important factors in explaining the variation 
in housing sale prices. The coefficient for the bedroom variable estimates that one additional 
bedroom in a home will increases the sale price 10.7%, while one additional full bathroom in a 
house increases the sale price by 16.0%. A 100 square foot increase in basement and garage area 
is estimated to increase sale price by 3.2% and 3.4%, respectively. Lot frontage was found to be 
more important than lot depth in housing price. An increase of 10 feet in frontage increases sale 
price by 3.3%, as compared to a 0.5% increase with an additional 10 feet of lot depth.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Multiple Buffer queries were performed using ArcView 9.0 software. 
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Table 4.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Hedonic 
Analysis (n=6368) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Sale Price($) 62688 39294 
Bedrooms 2.715 .862 
Bathrooms 1.313 .551 
Basement Area (sq. ft.) 711.89 331.36 
Garage Area (sq. ft.) 275.8 206.8 
Lot Frontage (ft.) 53.29 19.26 
Lot Depth (ft.) 113.02 34.87 
Structures within 500 ft. .417 1.00 
Structures 501-1000 ft. 1.123 2.244 
Structures 1001-1500 ft. 1.78 3.30 
Vacant lots within 500 ft. .648 2.04 
Vacant lots 501-1000 ft. 1.87 4.78 
Vacant lots 1001-1500 ft. 3.14 7.05 
Sold_2002_1 .063 .243 
Sold_2002_2 .070 .255 
Sold_2002_3 .061 .240 
Sold_2002_4 .057 .233 
Sold_2003_1 .051 .220 
Sold_2003_2 .059 .235 
Sold_2003_3 .066 .247 
Sold_2003_4 .064 .245 
Sold_2004_1 .046 .210 
Sold_2004_2 .077 .266 
Sold_2004_3 .067 .250 
Sold_2004_4 .070 .256 
Sold_2005_1 .057 .232 
Sold_2005_2 .070 .255 
Sold_2005_3 .073 .261 
Sold_2005_4 .048 .215 
 
   
Empirical results for categorical census tract variables can be found in Appendix D. All results 
are compared to characteristics of Census Tract (CT) 1. CT 1 and 12 are shown in the model to 
not be statistically different. The census shows that median income in CT1 is $30,344 and CT 12 
is $39,704; moreover, the median price asked for a house in CT 1 is $52,300 and CT 12 is 
$45,000. CT 18 is shown to be statistically different from CT 1 with a negative coefficient, 
meaning CT 1 is a more desirable area than CT 18. The census reveals that median income in CT 
18 is $14,821 and median price asked for a home is $20,500. CT 30 is shown to be statistically 
different from CT 1 with a positive coefficient, meaning CT 30 is more desirable than CT 1.  
Median income and median price asked in CT 30 are $55,223 and $93,800, respectively (U.S. 
Census). The results suggest that, throughout the city, socio-demographic variables that likely 
vary by census tract affect the value of homes within those areas.   
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Table 4.2 OLS Coefficient Estimates and P-Values 
 
Variable 
Coefficient Estimate 
(Standard Error) 
P-Value 
(T-Statistic) 
Bedrooms 0.1073 (0.0105) 0.000 (10.27) 
Bathrooms 0.1604 (0.0127) 0.000 (12.67) 
Basement Area  0.0320 (0.0018) 0.000 (17.37) 
Garage Area 0.0340 (0.0028) 0.000 (11.93) 
Lot Frontage 0.0333 (0.0033) 0.000 (10.16) 
Lot Depth 0.0052 (0.0019) 0.006 (2.76) 
Structures within 500 ft. -0.0226 (0.0111) 0.041 (-2.05) 
Structures 501-1000 ft. -0.0192 (0.0060) 0.001 (-3.18) 
Structures 1001-1500 ft. -0.0111 (0.0043) 0.011 (-2.55) 
Vacant lots within 500 ft. -0.0150 (0.0064) 0.020 (-2.33) 
Vacant lots 501-1000 ft. 0.0035 (0.0035) 0.324 (0.99) 
Vacant lots 1001-1500 ft. 0.0050 (0.0022) 0.023 (2.28) 
Sold_2002_2 0.105 (0.0319) 0.001 (3.28) 
Sold_2002_3 0.089 (0.0341) 0.008 (2.64) 
Sold_2002_4 0.066 (0.0351) 0.056 (1.91) 
Sold_2003_1 0.120 (0.0335) 0.000 (3.57) 
Sold_2003_2 0.138 (0.0327) 0.000 (4.23) 
Sold_2003_3 0.093 (0.0324) 0.004 (2.86) 
Sold_2003_4 0.077 (0.0331) 0.019 (2.34) 
Sold_2004_1 0.080 (0.0366) 0.026 (2.22) 
Sold_2004_2 0.138 (0.0326) 0.000 (4.24) 
Sold_2004_3 0.175 (0.0330) 0.000 (5.31) 
Sold_2004_4 0.184 (0.0322) 0.000 (5.70) 
Sold_2005_1 0.230 (0.0321) 0.000 (7.17) 
Sold_2005_2 0.227 (0.0312) 0.000 (7.19) 
Sold_2005_3 0.256 (0.0320) 0.000 (8.02) 
Sold_2005_4 0.235 (0.0322) 0.000 (7.29) 
Constant 9.673 (0.0532) 0.000 (181.89) 
Number of Observations = 6368 
F(68, 6299) = 114.20 
R-squared = 0.5630 
 
 
Coefficients for the categorical time variables are also consistent with expectations. The 
coefficients increase each quarter annually, with the exception of the first quarter of 2004. This 
exception may be accounted for by the harsh winter of 2004, during which property sales in 
Michigan may have suffered (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). 
 
The results support the hypothesis that higher numbers of abandoned structures surrounding 
residential properties are associated with lower housing values, all else constant. An additional 
abandoned structure is estimated to decrease surrounding housing prices within 500 feet by 
2.26%, to decrease housing prices by 1.95% between 501-1000 feet, and to decrease property 
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prices by an estimated 1.1% between 1001 and 1500 feet. Moreover, all three abandonment 
coefficients are highly statistically significant. 
 
Results also support the hypothesis that higher levels of vacant lots are associated with lower 
surrounding housing values, all else constant, but only for houses close to abandoned lots. An 
additional abandoned lot is estimated to decrease surrounding housing prices within 500 feet by 
1.5%. However, the coefficient for the 501-1000 feet vacant lot density variable suggest that an 
additional vacant lot does not affect nearby housing sale prices when located 501-1000 feet from 
a sale. The 1001-1500 vacant lot density variable suggests a 0.5% increase in price when an 
additional vacant lot is 1001-1500 feet from a sale. One explanation for this result may be that, 
while vacant lots in the immediate vicinity decrease value because of activities they foster or 
their appearance, vacant lots located a greater distance away create a perception of more open 
space or lower housing density, which have no effect or may even be desirable. 
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5.0 Property Value Impacts of the GCLB Structure Demolition 
Program 
The GCLB spent over $740,000 of public funds (tax penalty fees), $1.5 million in Brownfield 
Redevelopment bonds, and roughly $200,000 of an EPA grant in operating expenses for the 2005 
fiscal year. GCLB programs have put nearly $1.2 million dollars of equity back into Flint, 
providing over $68,000 of tax revenues in 2006 alone, and a total of over $100,000 since its 2002 
inception. These are direct, quantifiable effects of GCLB programs. This section focuses on 
indirect effects of the GCLB demolition program.  
 
At the end of the 2005 fiscal year, approximately $3.5 million had been spent on the GCLB 
demolition program, but no attempt has been made until this study to investigate whether the 
impacts of the demolition program justify these expenditures. The results from the hedonic 
analysis described in section 4 can be used to obtain a measure of returns to GCLB investments 
in the demolition program. In section 4, the marginal implicit prices of abandoned structures and 
vacant lots were estimated and shown to have a significant effect on neighborhood property 
values. Given that the demolition program creates vacant lots and reduces the number of 
abandoned structures, results from the hedonic analysis can be used to address the following 
question: Has the demolition program had a positive impact on property values in areas where 
demolitions have occurred?   
5.1 Method for Estimating Property Value Impacts 
Between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2005, the GCLB documented 435 completed 
demolitions at unique sites across the City of Flint. According to results obtained with the 
hedonic function, structures located at each of these sites were affecting all residential properties 
up to at least 1500 feet away. To estimate the property value impacts of the GCLB demolitions, 
the data for this study was adjusted to create a counterfactual reality in which property 
characteristics in the fourth quarter of 2005 appeared as though the land bank demolition 
program never existed. For example, if a property was a vacant lot in the fourth quarter of 2005 
because of a GCLB demolition that occurred during the fourth quarter of 2004, the property 
status reverted to an abandoned structure. Thus, in the counterfactual, the predicted sale price of 
a home that sold within 1500 feet of that property during the first quarter of 2005 would be 
affected by an abandoned structure, not a vacant lot. 
 
The first step in estimating the property value impacts of the GCLB demolition program was to 
locate each of the 435 demolition sites using GIS5. Then, a buffer ring was used to locate all 
residential properties within 1500 feet of the demolition sites. Based on results of the hedonic 
analysis, the number of properties affected by these demolitions totaled 26,197 residential 
properties (out of Flint’s roughly 44,500 total housing stock).  
 
Second, using individual parcel identification numbers, the unique property attributes used as 
variables in the hedonic price function were obtained for each of the 26,197 individual 
residential units from the Flint Assessor’s database. With this data and the status (lot or structure) 
                                                 
5 Properties were located using a 1500 ft. buffer query from the center point of each of the 435 GCLB effected 
properties using ArcView 9.0 software. 
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of tax-foreclosed properties from the GCLB database, a property attribute matrix was 
constructed containing every observation affected by one of the 435 demolitions (26,197 unique 
properties). To derive the status quo6 value of each of the 26,197 properties, each unique 
attribute of each observation was multiplied by the associated coefficients reported in table 4.2. 
The resulting values from the hedonic price functions provided the predicted price of each of the 
26,197 affected houses with the GCLB demolition program intact. (An example of this 
calculation is provided in Appendix E).  
 
Then, to estimate the impact of GCLB demolitions, the predicted price of each of the 26,197 
affected houses was recalculated based on the counterfactual or alternate scenario in which the 
GCLB demolition program did not exist (as shown in Appendix E). Essentially, this re-
calculation results in housing prices being affected by more abandoned structures and fewer 
vacant lots, as of fourth quarter 2005. The counterfactual predicted value, or expected value 
without GCLB demolitions, was then subtracted from the status-quo or expected value with the 
GCLB demolition program for each property. The aggregate value of the GCLB demolition 
program was derived by summing differences in property values for all properties.  
5.2 Property Value Impact Estimates 
The estimated status quo (ending 2005) market value of the 26,197 affected properties is 
$1,106,492,920. The estimated value of the 26,197 properties in the absence of the demolition 
program is $993,964,126. The difference, $112,528,793, is an estimate of the amount of property 
value retained in abandonment-affected neighborhoods as a result of the demolitions. Thus, the 
total value for the 26,197 affected properties is 10.17% higher as a result of the demolition 
program.   
 
This analysis allows us to quantify the impacts of a specific GCLB program – the demolition 
program. A total of 26,197 properties, nearly 60% of the residential housing in the City of Flint, 
have been positively affected by this program. Given the roughly $3.5 million spent on 
demolishing abandoned structures between 2002 and the end of the 2005 fiscal year, and using 
the estimated property value impact of $112,528,793 resulting from demolitions, net benefits of 
the GCLB demolition program exceed $109 million. With 26,197 residential units affected by 
the GCLB demolitions, on average, each demolition created more than $250,000 in value for the 
group of houses affected by the demolition. Results suggest that homeowners within 500 feet of 
a demolition gain 0.75% in property value; properties between 501 and 1000 feet of a demolition 
gain roughly 2.0% in value; and housing between 1001 and 1500 feet of a demolition gains 1.6% 
in value.  
 
The range of property value impacts for the 26,197 GCLB residential properties affected by the 
GCLB demolition program is shown in Appendix F. The magnitude of effects ranges from 
$116.98 to $50,036.62 per property. The value effects tend to be large in some areas of the city, 
and small in others. This difference could result from a number of factors, including (1) a small 
number of GCLB changes strongly affects property values in areas of the city with higher 
property values, (2) insufficient GCLB activity has occurred to register substantial change, or (3) 
many demolitions occurred in an area, so many properties reverted to vacant lots.   
                                                 
6 Status-quo property status refers to the property status of one of the 435 GCLB demolition sites at the end of the 
time period in this study – i.e. what the property status is today. 
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The property value impacts of the GCLB demolition program represent only a portion of GCLB 
impacts. Several other programs, as described earlier, are affecting the quality of neighborhood 
environments across the city, and are likely having impacts on property values as well.   
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6.0 Conclusions 
6.1 Policy Implications 
What do the findings reported in this study suggest about the impact of tax foreclosure and 
property abandonment in urban areas?  Similar to results in other research around the country, 
this study concludes that abandoned structures and vacant lots within neighborhood 
environments create negative impacts for neighboring properties. Moreover, these findings 
suggest that the GCLB and its demolition program are positively affecting property values 
throughout the City of Flint. A large part of the GCLB budget is made up of public dollars from 
tax-delinquency penalty fees and state-provided brownfield redevelopment funds. GCLB use of 
public funds is shown to have a positive impact on property values across much of Flint.   
 
One implication of these property value impacts is that the City of Flint may have an incentive to 
share financially in the management of GCLB properties. However, in order for Flint to help 
fund GCLB activities, the city will likely need to capture some of the higher property values 
through increased property taxes. This may prove difficult for several reasons. First, the city 
needs to get up-to-date assessments of all residential properties, something which has not been 
done since 1974 in some cases. However, in Michigan, Proposal A of 1994 caps annual increases 
in property taxes at 5% or the inflation rate – whichever is lower. Therefore, no more than a 5% 
increase in property taxes is possible regardless of value increases. The only way to realize total 
value increases is if a property sells and a title changes hands.   
 
Second, it is not clear that Flint has the resources available to undertake the reassessment. Third, 
the Flint housing market has been on the decline for over 30 years, meaning that assessed value 
of some homes could be lower today than when they were last assessed. Finally, reassessment is 
needed to capture the property value increases across the city, but reassessment may mean higher 
property taxes for some owners, which could send more properties into tax-foreclosure. 
6.2 Limitations of This Study 
Several spatial considerations introduce limiting factors in this study. The existence of a 
functional relationship between what happens at one location and what happens at another 
location, known as spatial autocorrelation, is potentially present in the sales data which were 
used to estimate the hedonic price function. Moreover, spatial heterogeneity, or a situation where 
the unobservable components of one dependent variable are related to those of a neighboring 
dependent variable, potentially exists. In order to test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation 
or spatial heterogeneity, a spatial weights matrix must be defined – the specification of which is 
controversial in spatial econometrics. A spatial weights matrix defines the sense in which 
properties are believed to be neighbors and determines the importance of any one observation 
with respect to the variable of interest for another observation (Taylor 2003). Although spatial 
autocorrelation potentially is present in this analysis, Leggett and Bockstael (2000) found that 
defining the spatial weights matrix and correcting for spatial autocorrelation in their study did 
not change their qualitative results substantially. Future additions to this study include the 
definition of a spatial weights matrix and testing for the presence of spatial issues. 
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A second limiting factor of this study is associated with the accurate measurement of an 
abandonment variable. According to our abandonment proxy, GCLB tax-foreclosed structures 
are consistent with Alexander’s (2005) definition of abandonment. Although all GCLB 
properties have been tax delinquent for two years and have become tax foreclosed, not all are 
slated for demolition. An estimated 70% of the structures that were tax foreclosed in 2006 are 
slated for demolition, meaning the characteristics of abandonment are present. However, a 
significant number of properties (over 100 in 2006) are not slated for demolition and are put into 
the rehabilitation, rental, or sales programs of the GCLB. Because deciphering which structures 
are slated for demolition and which are not is difficult with the GCLB database, all GCLB 
structures have been considered abandoned for this study, possibly introducing bias and error 
into coefficients and their interpretations. 
6.3 Opportunities for Future Research 
Several fruitful areas for future research are evident from this study. One opportunity is to use 
the estimates of property value impacts of the GCLB demolition program as an aid to deciding 
where future demolitions may have the greatest benefit in the City of Flint. Using GIS to map 
where different valued housing exists within the city alongside where different value changes 
have taken place with the demolition program can help the GCLB to prioritize resources as the 
inventory of tax foreclosed and abandoned properties grows each year and budget dollars 
become more scarce. 
 
A second interesting research question addresses the impact of raising property taxes to capture 
increased values resulting from urban revitalization efforts. Specifically, one could estimate how 
many of a city’s residents are on the verge of property tax delinquency and foreclosure and then 
determine what increase in property taxes, at the margin, would tip them into tax delinquency.  
This knowledge could help the city make incremental increases in property taxes that would fit 
the ability of those on the verge of delinquency to continue tax payments, avoiding additional tax 
foreclosures. 
 
Finally, this research can help new land banks across the State of Michigan measure the effects 
of their programs to estimate the return to public funding of their programs. This study shows 
that when urban areas are losing their population, industry, and desirable neighborhoods, they 
can protect their property values with demolition of abandoned structures and other programs 
made possible by the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Act.   
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Appendix A. Additional Information on Econometric Methods 
and Hedonic Analysis  
The hedonic price function is based on the economic theory that goods are ultimately valued by 
way of their utility-bearing attributes (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974).  Given a competitive 
market, specifically Flint’s housing market, buyers are assumed to sort themselves by deciding 
on a “bundle” of attributes (i.e. a house) that they are willing to purchase, given their income 
constraints and preferences.  The implicit prices of attributes will be decided by the supply of 
and demand for those particular attributes within the specified area (Deaton, 2002).   
 
Within competitive markets, a hedonic equilibrium requires that a change in the price of a house 
in response to a change in any attribute of that house should exactly equal the marginal bid and 
marginal offer of buyers and sellers of that house (Smith and Huang, 1995).  Given this 
assumption, we should be able to find people’s marginal willingness to pay for non-market 
attributes, such as decreased density of abandoned structures and lots nearby, as well as other 
structural, neighborhood, and environmental characteristics. 
 
The general form of the hedonic price function is: 
 
(1)     Pi = P(xi) 
 
where price (P) of the ith housing unit is a function of a vector of attributes, xi, of that house.  Li 
and Brown (1980), Deaton (2002), Simons, Quercia, and Maric (1998), Hite et al. (2001), and 
Farber (1998) all explain how to separate these value defining attributes. The differentiated 
commodity is assumed to be sold in a competitive market where the interactions between 
producers and consumers together determine the equilibrium price schedule for the differentiated 
commodity (residential housing) (Taylor 2003).   
 
The attractiveness of the estimated hedonic price function for applied welfare analysis lies in the 
potential to aggregate marginal willingness to pay for households in a given area to derive 
benefit estimates (Deaton 2002; Freeman 1993).  Small (1975) has shown that marginal changes, 
or the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to the environmental variable 
(abandonment and vacancy), is equivalent to marginal value or marginal willingness to pay.  For 
this reason, aggregate estimates of marginal willingness to pay for changes in the environmental 
variable can easily be calculated.  (Problems with this approach are discussed in Griswold 
(2006).) 
 
For this study, the empirical specification of the hedonic price function is: 
(2)  
( ) ( ) ( ) iiiiVLiSii uCTYXDDP +Ψ+Φ+Θ+++= 210ln βββ   
where the natural log of housing price, Pi , is determined by: (1) a vector of variables measuring 
density of abandoned single- and multi-family residential structures within the proximities of 0-
500 feet, 501-1000 feet, and 1001-1500 feet from a residential sale, S
iD ;(2) a vector of variables 
measuring density of vacant residential lots within the proximities of 0-500 feet, 501-1000 feet, 
and 1001-1500 feet from a residential sale, VL
iD ; (3) a vector of variables describing the physical 
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attributes of the house, 
iX ; (4) a vector of dummy variables describing the year and quarter in 
which the house sold, 
iY ; (5) and, a vector of dummy variables to account for which census tract 
the sold property was located in within the city of Flint, 
iCT .  The error term, iu , is assumed to 
have a conditional mean of zero and a constant variance. The functional form assumes a semi-log 
relationship between price of a house and the attributes which make up the value of the house.   
 
As Farber (1998) shows in his property value modeling literature review, the majority of hedonic 
studies have used a straight line distance measure to approximate relative exposure to different 
types of disamenities.  For this study, the distance-to-hazard measure derived for relative 
exposure to abandoned structure and lot disamenities is the number of tax-foreclosed structures 
and vacant lots within concentric distance rings surrounding a residential sale. The argument for 
this approach to measuring the abandonment variable arises from the difference between this 
research and most hedonic studies – this research accounts for the random geographic 
distribution of abandoned residential structures and vacant lots surrounding property sales, where 
all ‘disamenities’ are located at some proximity to each sold property.  A single straight line 
distance variable neglects to account for all other nearby property abandonment or lot vacancy 
that may affect a housing sale.  Straight line distance variables are more appropriate for housing 
markets affected by a single, large disamenity – such as a toxic waste facility.  The density type 
of distance measurement is more suited to the disamenity of interest in this study.  Limitations of 
this measurement method include a lack of information to understand the impact of an additional 
foot from abandoned property.  Moreover, the measured effects are assumed to impact all 
properties equally within each concentric circle, which is unlikely and may introduce error in the 
abandonment and vacancy proxy variables.   
 
In an attempt to avoid collinearity problems (Haab and McConnell 2002) when choosing 
variables to explain the physical attributes of a home, all variables included in the empirical 
model count actual space of a house and lot only once.  For example, square footage is omitted 
from the model, but number of bedrooms and bathrooms together are expected to account for this 
variable.     
 
For the set of dummy variables indicating the year and quarter during which a housing unit was 
sold, the numeraire chosen to be omitted in the hedonic price function is the first quarter of 2002.  
For the set of dummy variables included to indicate the census tracts in which houses sold 
throughout the City of Flint, the specific numeraire omitted in the model is Census Tract 1.  This 
census tract is categorized by middle-class incomes, a stable housing market, and a 
predominantly African-American population.   
 
The Breusch-Pagan test of the residuals rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity and, 
therefore, a valid estimator of the standard errors is obtained using a method known as White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator or ‘robust’ standard errors (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).  
As the dataset is pooled over time, serial-autocorrelation is ruled out as a potential issue. 
 
The marginal implicit prices of the hedonic price function itself can be used to derive aggregate 
benefit estimates given several assumptions.  Small (1975) has shown that a marginal change, or 
the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to the environmental variable 
(tax-foreclosure density), is equivalent to marginal value or marginal willingness to pay if  a 
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large number of utility maximizing individuals (Flint citizens) (1) are in short run equilibrium (2) 
with a fixed housing supply which offers enough variety so that each consumer can choose from 
a continuum of structural abandonment and lot vacancy levels, (3) and can do so independent of 
other housing characteristics.  Based on these assumptions, benefit estimates for the increased 
residential property values resulting from the GCLB demolition program are derived using the 
estimated coefficients of the hedonic price function.    
 
In addition to the means and standard deviations of variables shown in table 4.1 in the text, the 
means and standard deviations of census tract variables are shown in table A.1 below. 
Table A.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Census Tract (CT) Variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
CT_1 .017 
 
.130 CT_20 .005 .067 
CT_2 .011 .106 CT_22 .028 .165 
CT_3 .020 .140 CT_23 .025 .155 
CT_4 .009 .094 CT_24 .035 .185 
CT_5 .014 .117 CT_26 .036 .187 
CT_6 .014 .115 CT_27 .050 .218 
CT_7 .019 .135 CT_28 .007 .082 
CT_8 .007 .082 CT_29 .009 .093 
CT_9 .034 .182 CT_30 .064 .245 
CT_10 .014 .120 CT_31 .014 .116 
CT_11 .008 .090 CT_32 .011 .104 
CT_12 .042 .201 CT_33 .024 .152 
CT_13 .044 .201 CT_34 .001 .038 
CT_14 .009 .094 CT_35 .044 .205 
CT_15 .012 .107 CT_36 .087 .283 
CT_16 .087 .281 CT_37 .038 .191 
CT_17 .004 .064 CT_38 .008 .092 
CT_18 .007 .082 CT_39 .068 .252 
CT_19 .017 .130 CT_40 .057 .233 
Note: Census Tracts 21 and 25 were omitted because there were no residential sales 
between 2002 and 2005 in these areas. 
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Appendix B. GIS Structure Counting Diagram  
Figure B. 1. Illustration of Geographic Information System Counting of 
Abandoned Structures and Vacant Lots within 500 ft., 501-1000 ft., and 1001-
1500 ft. Distances from Residential Sale Observation 
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Appendix C. Residential Sale Prices in Flint  
Figure C.1. Range of Sale Prices for Residential Properties Sold in Flint, 
Michigan, 2002-2005.  
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Appendix D. Census Tract Variables 
Table D.1 OLS Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors) and P-Values (T-
Statistics) for Census Tract (CT) Variables 
 
Variable 
Coefficient  
(Standard Error) 
P-Value  
(T-Statistic) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient  
(Standard Error) 
P-Value  
(T-Statistic) 
CT_2** -.407(.086) 0.000(-4.72) CT_22 -.665(.059) 0.000(-11.25) 
CT_3 -.111(.047) 0.020(-2.33) CT_23 -.432(.047) 0.000(-9.12) 
CT_4 -.460(.094) 0.000(-4.88) CT_24 .132(.037) 0.000(3.58) 
CT_5 -.241(.060) 0.000(-4.04) CT_26 -.301(.041) 0.000(-7.30) 
CT_6 -.303(.076) 0.000(-3.99) CT_27 .135(.035) 0.000(3.85) 
CT_7 -.087(.058) 0.133(-1.50) CT_28 -.416(.121) 0.000(-3.45) 
CT_8 -.263(.117) 0.025(-2.24) CT_29 -.013(.063) 0.840(-0.20) 
CT_9 -.093(.047) 0.048(-1.97) CT_30 .545(.032) 0.000(16.96) 
CT_10 -.264(.080) 0.001(-3.32) CT_31 .257(.041) 0.000(6.33) 
CT_11 -.553(.110) 0.000(-5.03) CT_32 -.146(.078) 0.062(-1.86) 
CT_12 .025(.038) 0.522(0.64) CT_33 .342(.036) 0.000(9.57) 
CT_13 -.089(.041) 0.031(-2.15) CT_34 -.816(.134) 0.000(-6.09) 
CT_14 -.571(.101) 0.000(-5.67) CT_35 .206(.034) 0.000(6.00) 
CT_15 -.277(.077) 0.000(-3.60) CT_36 .244(.032) 0.000(7.55) 
CT_16 .281(.032) 0.000(8.71) CT_37 .124(.039) 0.012(3.18) 
CT_17 -.664(.144) 0.000(-4.63) CT_38 -.480(.092) 0.000(-5.20) 
CT_18 -.978(.094) 0.000(-10.44) CT_39 .303(.035) 0.000(8.74) 
CT_19 -.061(.045) 0.179(-1.34) CT_40 .077(.034) 0.023(2.27) 
CT_20 -.710(.150) 0.000(-4.73) Constant 9.673(.053) 0.000(181.89) 
Census Tract 1 is the omitted variable 
Note: Census Tracts 21 and 25 were omitted because there were no residential sales between 2002 and 2005 in these 
areas. 
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Appendix E. Calculation of Housing Prices with and without 
Nearby GCLB Demolitions 
The price of a house that sells in a neighborhood in Flint is expected to be a function of the 
variables used in the hedonic price model. Specifically,  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) iiiiVLiSii uCTYXDDP +Ψ+Φ+Θ+++= 210ln βββ  
 
where the variables in the model are as described in Appendix A. 
 
The impact of each individual variable is the estimated coefficient from the model. For example, 
the status quo (with the GCLB demolition program in place) sale price of a given house that sold 
during the fourth quarter of 2005 in census tract 40 with a specific set of characteristics could be 
calculated using the coefficients provided in table 4.2 as follows: 
 
ln (Pi) = 9.673 + (0.1703*number of bedrooms) + (0.1604*number of bathrooms) + 
(0.0320*basement area in sq. feet) + (0.0333* lot frontage in tens of feet) + (0.0052*lot depth in 
tens of feet) – (0.0226*number of abandoned structures within 500 feet) – (0.0192* number of 
abandoned structures between 501 and 1000 feet away) – (0.0111*number of abandoned 
structures between 1001 and 1500 feet away) – (0.0150*number of vacant lots within 500 feet) + 
(0.0035* number of vacant lots between 501 and 1000 feet away) + (0.0050*number of vacant 
lots between 1001 and 1500 feet away) + 0.235 + 0.077 
 
ln (Pi) is the natural log of the price. For example, if price = $50,000, then ln (Pi) = 10.820.  If the 
estimated natural log value is 10.820, then price is calculated using e10.820. 
 
For the counterfactual, the expected price of the same house without any demolitions nearby 
would be calculated in the same way, with the following exception. Assuming that one or more 
demolitions occurred somewhere within 1500 feet of the house, then one or more of the 
following variables would have a different value: 
• Number of abandoned structures within 500 feet 
• Number of abandoned structures between 501 and 1000 feet away 
• Number of abandoned structures between 1001 and 1500 feet away 
• Number of vacant lots within 500 feet 
• Number of vacant lots between 501 and 1000 feet away 
• Number of vacant lots between 1001 and 1500 feet away. 
 
For example, assume that the house that sold during the fourth quarter of 2005 in census tract 40 
was within 500 feet of three parcels on which structures were demolished during 2004, with no 
other abandoned structure or vacant lots anywhere within 1500 feet. That means that the variable 
for number of abandoned structures within 500 feet would have been zero in the status quo 
calculation but would be three in the counterfactual calculation. Similarly, the number of vacant 
lots within 500 feet would have been three in the status quo calculation but would be zero in the 
counterfactual calculation. 
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Appendix F. Unit Price Difference with and without 
Demolition 
Table F.1 Number of Units by Price Difference with Demolition versus 
without Demolition 
 
Price Difference  
With Demolition 
($) 
 
Number of Units 
Price Difference  
With Demolition 
($) 
 
Number of Units 
100-999.99 3412 19,000-19,999.99 33 
1,000-1,999.99 5214 20,000-20,999.99 20 
2,000-2,999.99 3996 21,000-21,999.99 20 
3,000-3,999.99 2910 22,000-22,999.99 7 
4,000-4,999.99 2282 23,000-23,999.99 6 
5,000-5,999.99 1844 24,000-24,999.99 10 
6,000-6,999.99 1442 25,000-25,999.99 4 
7,000-7,999.99 1207 26,000-26,999.99 2 
8,000-8,999.99 987 27,000-27,999.99 3 
9,000-9,999.99 740 28,000-28,999.99 3 
10,000-10,999.99 565 29,000-29,999.99 1 
11,000-11,999.99 443 31,000-31,999.99 2 
12,000-12,999.99 329 32,000-32,999.99 2 
13,000-13,999.99 236 34,000-34,999.99 1 
14,000-14,999.99 187 35,000-35,999.99 1 
15,000-15,999.99 106 36,000-36,999.99 1 
16,000-16,999.99 81 39,000-39,999.99 2 
17,000-17,999.99 59 44,000-44,999.99 1 
18,000-18,999.99 37 50,000-50,999.99 1 
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